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SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA UNDER HOME RULE
James C. McKay, Jr. *
I. INTRODUCTION
Three years ago Congress restored a measure of home rule to the
citizens of the District of Columbia by its enactment of the District of
Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act., In
the distribution of governmental powers, the Act closely follows the
federal tripartite model, vesting the legislative power in the Council, 2 the
executive power in the Mayor, 3 and the judicial power in the District of
Columbia courts.4 The importance of the principle of separation of
powers to the newly formed District of Columbia government has been
amply demonstrated by the number of conflicts between the three
branches during this short period. Each branch has, at times, charged the
* Assistant Corporation Counsel, District of Columbia. A.B., Cornell University, 1969;
J.D., University of Virginia School of Law, 1972. The opinions expressed in this article
are the author's own and are not necessarily those of the Office of the Corporation
Counsel.
I. Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973) [hereinafter referred to as the Self-
Government Act] enacted December 24, 1973. Title IV of the Act, the "District Charter,"
which is in effect the Constitution of the District of Columbia, became effective January
2, 1975, after acceptance by a majority of voters in a special Charter referendum. Id. §§
701, 704, 771, reprinted in D.C. Code § 1-121 note (Supp. V 1978). (All subsequent
references to the District of Columbia Code, unless otherwise indicated, are to the 1978
supplement to the 1973 edition).
Prior to this Act, the citizens of the District of Columbia had enjoyed differing degrees
of self-government at various times in the past, the last time during the short life of the
Legislative Assembly established by the Act of Feb. 21, 1871, ch. 62, 16 Stat. 419, and
abolished by the Act of June 20, 1874, ch. 337, 18 Stat. 116. The history of self-
government in the District is summarized in the committee reports on the Self-Govern-
ment Act. See S. REP. No. 93-219, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1973); H.R. REP. No. 93-482,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 47-49 (1973). See generally Newman & DePuy, Bringing
Democracy to the Nation's Last Colony: The District of Columbia Self-Government Act,
24 AM. U.L. REV. 537 (1975).
2. Self-Government Act § 404(a), D.C. Code § 1-144(a).
3. Id. § 422, D.C. Code § 1-162.
4. Id. § 431(a), D.C. Code, tit. 11, app., at 438. The term "District of Columbia
courts" embraces the Superior Court of the District of Columbia and the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals. Id. § 103(13), D.C. Code § 1-122(13).
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other two with serious encroachments. Although the Act reserved con-
siderable authority to the federal government over District affairs, 5 the
federal government, for the most part, has played a passive role, allow-
ing these conflicts to run their course.6
The separation of governmental powers is a structural principle funda-
mental to any democratic system of government.7 Accepted as such by
the drafters of the Constitution, it is a theme that appears throughout
their writings, notably in The Federalist,' Jefferson's Notes on the State
5. Congress retains its ultimate authority over the District of Columbia. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 17; see Self-Government Act § 601, D.C. Code § 1-126. The Act expressly
limits the legislative power of the Council in nine specific areas, id. § 602(a), D.C. Code §
1-147(a), including a two-year prohibition on the enactment of criminal laws, id. §
602(a)(9), D.C. Code § 1-147(a)(9), and a permanent prohibition on actions affecting the
District of Columbia courts, id. § 602(a)(4), D.C. Code § 1-147(a)(4). Moreover, the Act
reserves for the federal government a significant role in the local legislative process. No
act of the Council, except for a temporary emergency act, see id. § 412(a), D.C. Code § 1-
146(a), may take effect until it has lain before Congress for 30 working days when both
Houses are in session, during which Congress may disapprove the act by concurrent
resolution. Id. § 602(c), D.C. Code § 1-147(c). An act vetoed by the Mayor and overridden
by the Council must be submitted to the President for 30 calendar days, during which he
may sustain the Mayor's veto, before submission to Congress. Id. § 404(e), D.C. Code § 1-
144(e). Furthermore, the judges of the District of Columbia courts are appointed by the
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, from a list of candidates supplied by
the District of Columbia Judicial Nomination Commission. Id. § 433, D.C. Code, tit. I1,
app., at 440. Finally, the District lacks fiscal autonomy, as the President and Congress
retain the same authority over the District's budget as they possessed prior to home rule.
Id. § 603(a), D.C. Code § 47-228(a).
6. Congress has neither repealed nor disapproved by concurrent resolution a single
act of the Council, and the President has only once exercised his authority to sustain the
Mayor's overridden veto. See note 147 & accompanying text infra. Moreover, Charles C.
Diggs, Jr., Chairman of the House District of Columbia Committee, has introduced
legislation, H.R. 9404, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977), which would reduce the layover
period required for acts of the Council before Congress and would terminate the Presi-
dent's authority to veto overridden acts of the Council. The measure was redesignated
H.R. 12116, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), and was reported by the committee on May 1,
1978. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1104, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). President Carter has shown
his support for the termination of this presidential role. See Remarks of the Vice President
on the President's Decisions on the Task Force on the District of Columbia Recommenda-
tions, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1386 (Sept. 21, 1977). On the other side, however,
Congress extended the two-year prohibition of the Council's authority to enact criminal
laws for another two years-that is, until Jan. 3, 1979, Act of Sept. 7, 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-402, 90 Stat. 1220 (1976), and has routinely delayed its appropriation of the District's
budget. See Act of Dec. 9, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-205, 91 Stat. 1460 (1977).
7. The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the principle of separation of powers in
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 120 (1976), in which the Court invalidated parts of the
Federal Election Act providing for the appointment by congressional officers of a majori-
ty of the members of the executive Federal Election Commission as violative of the
appointments clause. See also Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 441-
46 (1977).
8. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47, 48, 49, 51, 71 (New Am. Lib. ed. 1961).
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of Virginia,9 and Washington's Farewell Address. 0 As Madison stated in
The Federalist, paraphrasing Montesquieu, "It]he accumulation of all
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether
of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."'"
The principle was premised on a healthy skepticism of the motives of
men in positions of power. As Madison explained:
This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the
defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole
system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it
particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of
power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the
several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on
the other-that the private interest of every individual may be a
sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence
cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme pow-
ers of the State.12
The application of the principle, of course, does not require the
complete separation of governmental powers or the hermetic sealing off
of each branch from the others.' 3 Indeed, the integrity of each branch
can only be ensured by granting each select powers over the others
sufficient to check them without controlling them. Thus, under the
Constitution, the President shares the legislative power by his ability to
veto acts of Congress, and he exerts an influence on the judiciary by his
authority to nominate all federal judges. Congress, in turn, shares the
President's power of executive appointment by its ability to confirm
executive officers, and it exerts an influence on the judicial branch by its
authority to confirm judges appointed by the President; moreover, it
keeps check on both branches by its power of the purse. The judiciary,
as the ultimate interpreter of the law of the land, possesses considerable
power over both branches. Of course, the power of one branch to check
another, being an exception to the general distribution of governmental
powers, must be expressly granted by the organic law establishing the
9. T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 120 (Univ. of N.C. ed. 1955),
quoted in THE FEDERALIST, supra note 8, No. 48 (J. Madison), at 310-11.
10. 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 219 (1895).
11. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 8, No. 47 (J. Madison), at 301.
12. Id. No. 51 (J. Madison), at 322.
13. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976); Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277
U.S. 189 (1928). In the latter case, the Court noted that "[tihe existence in the various
constitutions of occasional provisions expressly giving to one of the departments powers
which by their nature otherwise would fall within the general scope of the authority of
another department emphasizes, rather than casts doubt upon, the general inviolate
character of this basic rule." Id. at 202.
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governmental entity and may not be inferred from the basic powers of
the branch exerting the check. Thus, the President could hardly infer the
authority to veto acts of Congress from his executive authority alone.1
4
The core of the principle of separation of powers is that, subject to such
well defined exceptions, one branch may not, directly or indirectly,
compel or control the actions of another.'
5
In granting home rule to the District of Columbia, Congress did not
divide governmental powers strictly according to the federal model. It is
well settled that Congress is under no constitutional compulsion to do so
as its authority over the District under article I, section 8, clause 17, is
plenary.' 6 The most essential difference is that the legislative power of
the District, instead of being divided between two rival Houses and thus
weakened, is concentrated in a unicameral, thirteen-member Council. 17
Moreover, the checks given to certain branches against the others differ
in some respects from the federal model. Hence, while the Mayor, as the
President, may submit legislation1 8 and veto acts of the legislature,19 he
lacks the authority to nominate members of the judiciary. 20 While the
Council, as the Congress, holds the power of the purse over the execu-
tive branch, 21 it may not revise the budget of the judiciary; 22 nor is it
vested with the authority (with certain express exceptions) to participate
in the process of executive appointment. 23 The judicial branch of the
District government, in contrast, has fewer checks against it from
coequal branches than does the federal judiciary. 24 These differences,
14. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 285 (1976), (White, J., separate opinion).
15. See Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935); O'Donoghue
v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933); Massachusetts v. Melon, 262 U.S. 447, 488
(1923).
16. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973)(Congress not required to assure
criminal defendant in District of Columbia accused of crime against United States of a trial
by an article III judge with life tenure, but may create article I courts to hear such cases);
Keller v. PEPCO, 261 U.S. 428, 443 (1921); Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S.
210, 225 (1908).
17. Self-Government Act §§ 401(b), 404(a), D.C. Code §§ 1-141(b), 1-144(a). Only one
State, Nebraska, has a unicameral legislature. NEB. REV. STAT. Const. art. III, § 1 (1975).
See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 8, No. 62 (J. Madison) at 279.
18. Self-Government Act § 422(5), D.C. Code § 1-162(5).
19. Id. § 404(e), D.C. Code §1-144(e).
20. His appointment authority over the District of Columbia courts is limited to his
power to appoint two of the seven members of the District of Columbia Judicial Nomina-
tion Commission, id. § 434(b)(4)(C), D.C. Code tit. 11, app., at 442, and two of the seven
members of the District of Columbia Commission on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure, id.
§ 431(e)(3)(C), D.C. Code tit. 11, app., at 439.
21. Self-Government Act § 442, D.C. Code § 47-221.
22. Id. § 445, D.C. Code tit. 11, app., at 443.
23. See Part 1I-A infra.
24. See Part III infra.
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however, do not diminish the importance of the principle of separation of
powers in the District government. Though the balance is somewhat
different, owing to the fundamental differences between national and
local government, the theory remains the same.
A strengthening of the executive and judiciary branches was, in part,
required by the consolidation of legislative power of the District govern-
ment in a single body. It is significant that while advocating the principle
of separation of powers the chief fear of the drafters of the Constitution
was the fear of legislative despotism. As Madison warned:
The legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere
of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.
. . . Its constitutional powers being at once more extensive,
and less susceptible of precise limits, it can, with the greater
facility, mask, under complicated and indirect measures, the
encroachments which it makes on the co-ordinate
departments.25
And as Hamilton added:
The tendency of the legislative authority to absorb every other
has been fully displayed and illustrated by examples in some
preceding numbers. In governments purely republican, this
tendency is almost irresistible. The representatives of the peo-
ple, in a popular assembly, seem sometimes to fancy that they
are the people themselves, and betray strong symptoms of im-
patience and disgust at the least sign of opposition from any
other quarter; as if the exercise of its rights, by either the
executive or the judiciary, were a breach of their privilege and
an outrage to their dignity. They often appear disposed to exert
an imperious control over the other departments; and as they
commonly have the people on their side, they always act with
such momentum as to make it very difficult for the other mem-
bers of the government to maintain the balance of the Constitu-
tion.2 6
Recent commentators have asserted that the founders' fear of legislative
despotism is groundless in view of the enhancement of the powers of the
Presidency through its receipt of broad powers delegated from the
Congress. 27 But whatever the validity of such observations in the federal
context, the fear of legislative encroachment by the legislative branch of
the District government, where the unicameral Council has refused to
25. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 8, No. 48 (J. Madison), at 309.
26. Id. No. 71 (A. Hamilton), at 433.
27. See, e.g., Frohnmayer, The Separation of Powers: An Essay on the Vitality of a
Constitutional Idea, 52 ORE. L. REV. 211,215 (1973).
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delegate any significant amount of its power to the Mayor, is very much
warranted.
II. THE LEGISLATURE V. THE EXECUTIVE
True to the fears of Madison and Hamilton, most of the conflicts that
have occurred thus far in the District under home rule have involved
encroachments by the legislature upon the powers of the other two
branches, especially the executive. The Council has, at various times,
attempted to interfere with the Mayor's power to appoint executive
officers, veto legislation, and control executive agencies. Conversely,
the Council has charged the executive with infringing upon its supposed
authority over the qualifications of its members. The unfortunate result
of such conflicts, many of which are unresolved, has been a Continual
tension between the executive and the legislature.
A. Confirmation Requirements and the Executive
Power of Appointment
One of the most essential elements of the executive power is the power
of appointment. Most of the Mayor's authority, especially with regard to
day-to-day governmental operations, is exercised in his behalf by the
heads of agencies of the District government.2" Typical executive func-
tions, such as the assessment of real property for tax purposes,2 9 the
removal of snow and ice from public highways, 30 and the implementation
of the Federal Energy Administration's weatherization assistance pro-
gram for low income persons,3' are carried out by such officers.3 2 It is
therefore not surprising that the scope of the Mayor's power to appoint
executive officers has been the subject of controversy. Considerable
28. See Self-Government Act § 422(6), D.C. Code § 1-162(6):
The Mayor may delegate any of his functions (other than the function of approv-
ing or disapproving acts passed by the Council or the function of approving
contracts between the District and the Federal Government under section 731
[D.C. Code § 1-826]) to any officer, employee, or agency of the executive office
of the Mayor, or to any director of an executive department who may, with the
approval of the Mayor, make a further delegation of all or a part of such functions
to subordinates under his jurisdiction.
29. Delegated to the Director of the Department of Finance and Revenue. Mayor's
Orders Nos. 75-55, 75-114, 1 D.C. Stat. 440, 468 (1975).
30. Delegated to the Directors of the Department of Transportation and the Depart-
ment of Environmental Services. Mayor's Order No. 75-218, 1 D.C. Stat. 506 (1975).
31. Delegated to the Director of the Department of Housing and Community Devel-
opment. Mayor's Order No. 77-126, 24 D.C. Reg. 1917 (1977).
32. Cf. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926): "The vesting of the executive
power in the President was essentially a grant of the power to execute the laws. But the
President alone and unaided could not execute the laws. He must execute them by the
assistance of subordinates .... ." Quoted in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 135 (1976).
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conflict between the legislative and executive branches has been
generated by the Council's continual attempts to grant itself the power of
confirmation. Two measures, the Confirmation Act of 197633 and the
Organization of Offices, Agencies, Departments and Instrumentalities
Act of 1976, 34 both introduced January 13, 1976, would have required the
Mayor's appointments of the heads of his principal executive agencies to
be submitted to and confirmed by the Council. It is clear, however, from
the text and legislative history of the Self-Government Act, that the
Mayor's power of executive appointment under the Charter is exclusive
and may not be diluted by the Council through its use of the legislative
power.
The Mayor inherited much of this power from the appointed Commis-
sioner of the District of Columbia, the chief executive officer of the
District government prior to home rule under Reorganization Plan No. 3
of 1967. 35 The vast majority of the District agencies currently in exist-
ence were created pursuant to this Reorganization Plan, and the
Commissioner was vested with the sole authority to appoint executive
officers. 36 The Self-Government Act continued these agencies in exist-
ence37 and transferred all of the functions of the Commissioner to the
Mayor, 38 including the exclusive power to appoint the heads of these
agencies.
Moreover, the authority to appoint the officers of either existing or
new agencies which may be established by the Mayor 39 or the Council4"
is clearly implicit in the language of section 422 of the Charter,4 which
vests the executive power of the District in the Mayor and makes him the
chief executive of the District government. The legislative history of the
Act supports this interpretation; as the Senate Report notes:
The executive power of the District shall be vested in the
Mayor who shall be the chief executive officer of the District
33. Bill No. 1-225, 22 D.C. Reg. 3781 (1976), introduced by Council members Dixon,
Winter, Clarke, Coates, Wilson, Shackleton, D. Moore, and Hobson.
34. Bill No. 1-234, 22 D.C. Reg. 4008 (1976), introduced by Council member Barry.
35. 3 C.F.R. 1026 (1966-70 Comp.), reprinted in D.C. Code, tit. 1, app., at 150 (1973),
and in 81 Stat. 948 (1967).
36. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1967, § 303, 3 C.F.R. 1029 (1966-70 Comp.), reprinted
in D.C. Code, tit. 1, app., at 151 (1973), and in 81 Stat. 950 (1967).
37. Self-Government Act § 714, D.C. Code § 1-133.
38. Id. § 422, D.C. Code § 1-162: "In addition, except as otherwise provided in this
Act, all functions granted to or vested in the Commissioner of the District of Columbia, as
established under Reorganization Plan Numbered 3 of 1967, shall be carried out by the
Mayor in accordance with this Act."
39. Self-Government Act § 422(12), D.C. Code § 1-162(12).
40. Id. § 404(b), D.C. Code § 1-144(b).
41. D.C. Code § 1-162.
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government. He shall be responsible for the proper administra-
tion of the affairs of the District coming under his jurisidiction
and control. The bill confers on him the usual administrative
powers and duties, including the power to appoint personnel in
the executive branch of the city government and to remove such
personnel in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.
(Emphasis added).12
It is particularly significant that the Self-Government Act contains noth-
ing similar to the appointments clause of the Constitution43 conditioning
the President's appointment of executive officers on the "advice and
consent of the Senate." Such a diminution of this inherently executive
function must be expressly granted to the legislature by the organic law 44
and may not be assumed by that branch through its legislative powers. 45
That Congress did not intend a general dilution of this power of the
Mayor is clear from its inclusion in the Self-Government Act of express
provisions subjecting the Mayor's appointment of the officers of certain
independent agencies to "the advice and consent of the Council."146
Other than such express limitations on the executive power of appoint-
ment in this or other acts of Congress, however, nothing qualifies the
authority of the Mayor to appoint executive officers. His power is
exclusive.
For these reasons, the Corporation Counsel, in his review of these
bills, concluded that they would constitute a "serious encroachment
upon the executive power of the Mayor" in violation of the principle of
42. S. REP. No. 93-219, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973) (reporting on S. 1435, 93d Cong.,
Ist Sess., § 402 (1973)). Cf. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926).
43. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
44. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976); Gillson v. Heffernan, 40 N.J. 367,
192 A.2d 583 (1963); Visone v. Reilly, 80 N.J. Super. 494, 194 A.2d 577 (1963); Walker v.
Baker, 145 Tex. Civ. App. 121, 196 S.W.2d 324 (1946); People v. Shawyer, 30 Wyo. 366,
222 P. 11 (1923).
45. It is significant that earlier drafts of the United States Constitution vested the
President with the exclusive authority, subject to certain express exceptions, to appoint
all officers of the United States. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 129-31, 271-74 (1976).
46. Namely, the Board of Elections, Self-Government Act § 491, D.C. Code § 1-1103;
the Zoning Commission, id. § 492, D.C. Code § 5-412; the Public Service Commission, id.
§ 493, D.C. Code § 43-201a; and the Armory Board, id. § 494, D.C. Code § 2-1702. In
addition, certain acts prior to home rule expressly vested the former District of Columbia
Council with the authority to confirm certain officers appointed by the Commissioner-
namely, the People's Counsel, D.C. Code § 43-205(b); the members of the Board of
Equalization and Review, D.C. Code § 47-646(a); the members of the Housing Rent
Commission, D.C. Code § 45-1623(a) (Supp. 11 1975); and the members of the Redevelop-
ment Land Agency, D.C. Code § 5-703(a). As the Mayor inherited the power of the
Commissioner to appoint these officers, Self-Government Act § 422, D.C. Code § 1-162,
the present Council of the District of Columbia inherited the power of the old District of
Columbia Council to confirm these officers. Id. § 404(a), D.C. Code § 1-144(a).
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separation of powers embodied in the Self-Government Act, and he
recommended that they be disapproved.4 7 Both bills subsequently died in
committee.48 The controversy, however, is far from being resolved. Bill
No. 2-11,1 9 introduced January 3, 1977, would subject the Mayor's ap-
pointment of all executive agency heads under the proposed District
Government Independent Merit Personnel Act 5° to Council confirma-
tion. The Corporation Counsel has reaffirmed his opposition to such an
enactment.
51
Further conflict over the scope of the Mayor's appointment power has
been generated by the Council's establishment of so-called "indepen-
dent" agencies as a means of circumventing the Mayor's appointment
authority. However, whether a governmental entity is an executive agen-
cy, rather than a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial agency, depends upon
the statutory functions of the agency. If the functions are primarily
investigative or informational, it is a legislative agency, 52 but if it is given
authority to administer or enforce the laws of the District of Columbia,
then it is an executive agency and, hence, by virtue of section 422 of the
Self-Government Act, is under the appointive authority of the Mayor.
53
The Council has enacted legislation establishing several such "inde-
pendent" agencies headed by officers appointed by the Mayor "with the
advice and consent of the Council"--namely, the Office of Aging, 54 the
Commission on the Arts and Humanities, 55 the District of Columbia
47. Unpublished Opinion of the Corp. Counsel re Bill No. 1-225 & Bill No. 1-234 (Mar.
26, 1976).
48. See Rule 6Q of the Rules of Organization and Procedure of the Council, Res. No.
2-1, 23 D.C. Reg. 7984, 8021 (1977).
49. 23 D.C. Reg. 4603 (1977), introduced by Council member Dixon.
50. Bill No. 2-10, 23 D.C. Reg. 4488 (1977), introduced by Council member Dixon.
Section 422(3) of the Self-Government Act, D.C. Code § 1-162(3), requires the Council to
provide for a merit system for District government employees, who are currently in the
federal civil service, no later than Jan. 3, 1980.
51. Opinion of the Corp. Counsel re Bill No. 2-11, Confirmation Amendments Act, I
Op. C.C.D.C. 459 (1977). Moreover, the Legislative Research Center of Georgetown
Univ. Law Center (D.C. Project), at the request of Council member Dixon, researched the
issue of Council confirmation of executive appointments and ironically, in an unpublished
analysis dated June 15, 1976, came to the same conclusion as the Corporation Counsel. A
similar conclusion was reached by Leon Ullman, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, in an unpublished memorandum to Kenneth Lazarus, Associate
Counsel to the President, dated Apr. 7, 1976, concerning the D.C. Budget Act.
52. Self-Government Act § 413, D.C. Code § 1-148, provides that: "[t]he Council, or
any committee or person authorized by it, shall have power to investigate any matter
relating to the affairs of the District . . ."
53. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.' 1, 137-43 (1976); Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277
U.S. 189, 202 (1928).
54. D.C. Law No. 1-24, § 302, D.C. Code § 6-1712.
55. D.C. Law No. 1-22, § 4, D.C. Code § 31-1903.
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General Hospital Commission 5 6 and the Commission on Licensure to
Practice the Healing Arts. 57 The first measure, the Act on Aging, was
signed by the Mayor without mention of this objectionable provision.
However, the Mayor, on the advice of the Corporation Counsel that such
provision contravened the Charter,5 8 did not refer his appointment of the
head of that agency to the Council for confirmation, 59 and the Council
has not challenged this action. The second measure, the Commission on
the Arts and Humanities Act, was vetoed by the City Administrator as
Acting Mayor,6 and, as the Council failed to override the veto within 30
days as required by the Charter,6 the Commission has, at most, a de
facto status. 62 The Mayor vetoed the final two measures, but was over-
ridden by the Council and has permitted the Council to "confirm" his
appointments. Unfortunately, the Mayor's apparent acquiescence with
respect to the appointment of the officers of the agencies created by
these bills runs the danger of encouraging further attempted encroach-
ments, thereby perpetuating the controversy over the scope of the May-
or's power of appointment.
B. Legislation by Resolution: Circumventing The
Veto Power of the Mayor
Other conflicts between the legislative and executive branches have
been engendered by the Council's use of resolutions.63 Under the Char-
ter, the Council is empowered to take two kinds of formal action: it may
56. D.C. Law No. 1-134, §§ 202(a), 205, D.C. Code §§ 32-1312(a), 32-1315.
57. D.C. Law No. 1-106, § 2(a)(1), D.C. Code § 2-103(a)(1).
58. Opinion of the Corp. Counsel re App't of the Exec. Dir. of the Office on Aging, I
Op. C.C.D.C. 526 (1977).
59. The Act on Aging also created an advisory Commission on Aging with 15 lay
members appointed by the Mayor with the advice and consent of the Council. Id. § 402,
D.C. Code § 6-1721. The Mayor has permitted the Council to confirm these members as
the Commission has no executive authority.
60. Self-Government Act § 422(1), D.C. Code § 1-162(1), authorizes the Mayor to
"designate the officer or officers of the executive department of the District who may,
during periods of disability or absence from the District of the Mayor execute and perform
the powers and duties of the Mayor." The power to designate such a temporary Acting
Mayor is distinct from the power to delegate executive functions to subordinates to carry
out the day-to-day functions of the executive under § 422(6) of the Act, D.C. Code
§ 1-162(6). See Unpublished Opinion of the Corp. Counsel re Whether the City Adm'r
May Veto an Act of the Council (July 11, 1975).
61. Self-Government Act § 404(e), D.C. Code § 1-144(e).
62. The Mayor has appointed and the Council has "confirmed" members of the
Commission.
63. See generally Opinion of the Corp. Counsel re The Legal Force & Effect of a
Resolution Adopted by the Council. I Op. C.C.D.C. 261 (1976).
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pass acts and adopt resolutions. The distinction between them is defined
in section 412(a): "The Council shall use acts for all legislative pur-
poses. . . .Resolutions shall be used to express simple determinations,
decisions, or directions of the Council of a special or temporary charac-
ter. '64 An act of the Council is subject to a number of prerequisites
before taking effect. A proposed act must be read twice in substantially
the same form at an interval of at least thirteen days; 65 it must be
presented to the Mayor for approval; 66 and, if approved (or not disap-
proved within ten working days), it must lie before Congress for thirty
legislative days when both Houses are in session before taking effect. 67
If vetoed by the Mayor and overridden by the Council, it must first be
submitted to the President. 68 The Council may dispense with the require-
ment of a second reading or of congressional review only under emergen-
cy circumstances, in which case two-thirds of the members present and
voting may enact a temporary act, effective for a maximum period of
ninety days.69 A resolution, by contrast, takes effect immediately upon
adoption. 70 It is effective without any review by the Mayor, the
Congress, or the President.
The vast majority of resolutions adopted by the Council are proper
uses of this device. They fall into two broad categories: resolutions
which are purely symbolic and without any legal effect, and resolutions
by which the Council exercises administrative or ministerial functions
vested solely in that body by law. The first category includes resolutions
honoring persons or groups, commemorating certain days, weeks,
months, or years; expressing the opinion of the Council on public issues;
and requesting or urging-but not compelling-certain actions by the
Mayor, the courts, or the federal government. The second category
includes resolutions making rules with respect to the internal organiza-
tion or procedure of the Council; appointing or directing personnel
64. D.C. Code § 1-146(a).
65. Self-Government Act § 412(a), D.C. Code § 1-146(a).
66. Id. § 404(e), D.C. Code § 1-144(e).
67. Id. § 602(c), D.C. Code § 1-147(c).
68. Id. § 404(e), D.C. Code § 1-144(e).
69. Id. § 412(a), D.C. Code § 1-146(a). See generally Opinion of the Corp. Counsel re
Emerg. Legis. Auth. of the Council. I Op. C.C.D.C. 467 (1977).
70. Under Council practice, resolutions may be adopted after a single reading at the
biweekly legislative session. See Rules of Organization and Procedure of the Council,
Res. No. 2-1, Rule 6, 23 D.C. Reg. 7984, 8014 (1977). Proposed resolutions (and bills) are
subject to a 15 day notice requirement; however, this may be despensed with by a simple
declaration by the Council that an emergency exists. Rule 6G, id. at 8017. Moreover, a
resolution may be considered at a special session called for that purpose. Rule 6B, id. at
8014. Resolutions may be referred to a committee, but in practice are generally retained by
the Council. Rule 6D, id. at 8016.
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employed by the Council; 71 investigating the affairs of the District;72
confirming nominees to District offices by the Mayor or Chairman of the
Council pursuant to statutes expressly authorizing Council confirma-
tion;73 appointing members of District boards, commissions, or other
bodies pursuant to statutes expressly authorizing such appointments ;74
disapproving executive reorganization plans; 75 and approving applica-
tions for grants to the District under federal law.
Some confusion, however, resulted from the transfer of certain func-
tions of the former, appointive District of Columbia Council, established
under Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1967, to the present Council. The
former Council had been given over 430 specific "quasi-legislative" 76
functions formerly exercised by the Board of Commissioners of the
District of Columbia, the three member, appointive body that governed
the District from 1874 to 1967. Section 404(a) of the Charter 77 transferred
these functions to the new Council, as section 422 transferred the func-
tions of the Commissioner to the Mayor. 78 The former Council's exercise
of many of these "quasi-legislative" functions was made subject to the
approval of the Commissioner-namely, those "in respect of rules and
regulations. . or. . .penalties or taxes." 79 Some important functions,
however, were not made subject to his approval. The Council's exercise
of one of these functions, the closing of public streets and alleys, 80 gave
71. Self-Government Act § 401(c), D.C. Code § 1-141(c).
72. Id. § 413(a), D.C. Code § 1-148(a). See note 52 supra.
73. See, e.g., Self-Government Act § 455(a), D.C. Code § 47-120(a) (District of
Columbia Auditor).
74. See, e.g., id. § 431(e)(3)(D), D.C. Code, tit. 11, app., at 439 (one member of the
District of Columbia Commission on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure); id. § 434(b)(4)(D),
D.C. Code, tit. 11, app., at 442 (one member of the District of Columbia Judicial
Nomination Commission).
75. Id. § 422(12), D.C. Code § 1-162(12). Congress was careful to expressly provide the
Council with this power in the Charter in view of the controversy over the power of
Congress to subject the President's reorganization authority to congressional veto, see 5
U.S.C. § 901 (1970), without express authority to do so in the Constitution. The Supreme
Court, unfortunately, has declined to resolve this important issue. Atkins v. United
States, 556 F.2d 1028 ( Ct. Cl. 1977) (4-3 decision), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 718 (1978). See
generally Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive,
63 CALIF. L. REV. 983 (1975).
76. See Special Message to Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1967
(June 1, 1967), 1 PuB. PAPERS OF PRES. JOHNSON 585, 586 (1968), reprinted in D.C. Code,
tit. 1, app., at 163 (1973).
77. D.C. Code § 1-144(a).
78. D.C. Code § 1-162. See note 38 supra.
79. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1967 § 406, 3 C.F.R. 1058-59 (1966-70 Comp.),
reprinted in D.C. Code, tit. 1, app., at 161 (1973), and in 81 Stat. 978 (1967).
80. Id. § 402(168), 3 C.F.R. 1040 (1966-70 Comp.), reprinted in D.C. Code, tit. 1, app.,
at 155 (1973), and in 81 Stat. 961 (1967).
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rise to considerable controversy over the Council's use of its authority to
adopt resolutions.
The closing of streets and alleys under the Street Readjustment Act of
the District of Columbia8' is essentially a legislative action. As the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals stated, in construing that Act,
"the Council in determining whether to close a street is exercising
legislative discretion based upon primarily legislative facts.", 82 The for-
mer Council chose to exercise this function by resolution. As the action
did not concern rules, regulations, penalties, or taxes, it was not submit-
ted to the executive. However, the ability of the former Council to take
this legislative action by resolution did not authorize the present Council
to do the same. The present Council is required to carry out the functions
it inherited from the former Council "in accordance with the provisions
of [the Self-Government] Act," 8 3 and section 412 of that Act requires the
Council to "use acts for all legislative purposes .
Perhaps misled by the practice of the former Council, the present
Council adopted dozens of resolutions purporting to close various streets
and alleys. 84 This practice continued until the end of 1976, despite sever-
al critical opinions issued by the Corporation Counsel.8 5 In an effort to
resolve this conflict, the Mayor proposed, and the Council passed, an
emergency act validating all of the closings purported to be effected by
81. D.C. Code § 7-401 to 410 (1973).
82. Chevy Chase Citizens Ass'n v. District of Columbia Council, 327 A.2d 310, 316
(D.C. 1974). The court continued:
Thus the Council, in deciding whether to close a street, considers and devises
broad policy-that goes beyond the circumstances of specific parties-relating
instead to the public generally. Policy decisions must be made with respect to
such matters as traffic flow, transportation facilities, population density, and
proper mixture of housing, commercial facilities, sihools and parks. In making
these policy decisions, the Council tends to cohksult broad relevant surveys,
studies and published reports. Expertise from other government departments is
sought. Since at a public hearing any interested person may offer his opinion
regarding the proposed closing, the Council considers the opinion not only of the
abutting property owners but also of the public generally. In short, the Council in
deciding whether to close a street conducts a quasi-legislative hearing, sitting in a
legislative capacity, making policy decisions directed toward the general public.
(Citation omitted).
id. at 316-17.
83. Self-Government Act § 404(a), D.C. Code § 1-144(a).
84. E.g., Res. Nos. 1-128, 1-129, 1-130, 1-131, 1-132, 1-133, 1 D.C. Stat. 299, 300, 301,
302, 303, 304 (1975); Res. Nos. 1-188, 1-189, 1-209, 1-210, 1-214, 1-216, 1-231, 1-249, 22
D.C. Reg. 4191, 4193, 5059, 5062, 5368, 5489, 5497, 6472 (1976).
85. Opinion of the Corp. Counsel re The Legal Force & Effect of a Resolution
Adopted by the Council, supra note 63; Opinion of the Corp. Counsel re Whether Certain
Functions of the Council with Respect to Alley Closings, Street Dedications, & Highway
Plan Amendments May be Exercised by Act or Resolution. I Op. C.C.D.C. 368 (1976).
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resolution prior to the effective date of the act. 6 The act also delegated
the function of closing streets and alleys to the Mayor, subject to Council
approval, since using an executive order of the Mayor rather than an act
of the Council would obviate the often extensive Congressional layover
period required for all permanent acts of the Council. However, this
emergency act expired March 29, 1977, and the Council has failed to
enact similar permanent legislation proposed by the Mayor.87 And al-
though, since December 1976, the Council has used acts instead of
resolutions to close streets or alleys, 8 the controversy still persists as the
Council has continually asserted that it may legally close streets and
alleys by resolution.8 9
C. Resolutions Compelling Executive Officers
An entirely distinct use of the resolution by the Council, which has
also raised separation of powers problems, is the use of this device to
direct the activities of principal executive officers and the Mayor him-
self. Such a use of the resolution presumes a power over the executive
which the Council simply does not possess. For example, Resolution No.
1-74 "directs the Metropolitan Police Department to adopt manpower
distribution policies which would significantly increase foot patrols in
the District of Columbia." 9 Resolution No. 1-241 "instructs the Office
of the Corporation Counsel to represent the Council of the District of
Columbia in opposition to Columbia Federal [Savings and Loan
Association]'s application before any legal proceedings held by the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board or any of its regional offices."'" And
Resolution No. 1-392 would require certain standards and procedures to
be followed by the District of Columbia Accounting Office, the District
of Columbia Treasurer, and other District agencies in the processing of
vouchers and issuance of checks.92 Clearly, the authority of the Police
86. The Emergency Street & Alley Closing Act of 1976, Act No. 1-184, 23 D.C. Reg.
4928 (1977) (eff. Dec. 29, 1976).
87. In Bill No. 2-56, 23 D.C. Reg. 5422 (1977), introduced Jan. 19, 1977, the Council
excised the provisions delegating authority to the Mayor and substituted language re-
validating closings validated by Act 1-184, the Emergency Street & Alley Closing Act of
1976.
88. See, e.g., D.C. Laws Nos. 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-6, 23 D.C. Reg. 8193, 8197, 8200,
8203, 8206 (1977).
89. See Act No. 2-34, 23 D.C. Reg. 9236 (1977); Act No. 2-74, 24 D.C. Reg. 1784 (1977);
Act No. 2-114, 24 D.C. Reg. 4834 (1977).
90. 1 D.C. Stat. 235 (1975).
91. 22 D.C. Reg. 5995, 5997 (1976).
92. 23 D.C. Reg. 3778 (1976). Contra, 1 Op. C.C.D.C. 105 (1976); see § 449(a) of the
Charter, D.C. Code § 47-227(a), which provides that "the Mayor shall . . . prescribe the
forms of receipts, vouchers, bills and claims to be used by all the agencies, offices, and
instrumentalities of the District government . .. ."
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Chief over the distribution of his forces, the authority of the Corporation
Counsel over the invitation of litigation, and the authority of the District
of Columbia Treasurer over the processing of vouchers and the issuance
of checks are at the very heart of the responsibilities of those officers.
The Council may not direct their activities; only the Mayor possesses
such authority.
Other resolutions purport to direct the actions of the Mayor himself.
For example, Resolution No. 1-244 "directs the Mayor to construct
within six months . . . a ramp designed for use by the physically hand-
icapped . . . and install an automatic door which operates with a treadle
at the 13 and 1/2 Street entrance of the District Building."-93 Another
resolution, No. 1-326, 94 requires the Mayor to submit to the Council a
budget that would involve no increase in the overall tax burden to
District taxpayers. The Self-Government Act requires the Mayor to
submit an annual budget to the Council, 95 but does not authorize the
Council to impose conditions on the Mayor's preparation of the budget
or to require him to submit an additional "no-tax-increase" budget
according to Council specifications. These resolutions represent at-
tempts by the Council to assume direct control over matters committed
to the discretion of the Mayor and his subordinate officers and clearly
violate section 422 of the Charter, which vests the executive authority of
the District in the Mayor. Thus, they were considered to have no legal
effect .96
Several other resolutions, while not interfering quite as severely with
the functions of the executive, would have imposed considerable bur-
dens on certain executive agencies by requiring the collection of exten-
sive statistical data, the undertaking of studies, the preparation of re-
ports, or the publication and dissemination of information. A prime
example is Resolution No. 1-99, which "directs the Office of Community
Services of the Municipal Planning Office and the Office of Public
Affairs to collect data by ward and census tract and to organize and make
available to Council members, to government officials, and to interested
members of the public data so collected." 9 Moreover, it requires these
agencies "to establish a mechanism for disseminating, on a regular basis,
all information, reports and studies collected or prepared by the District
93. 22 D.C. Reg. 6392, 6393 (1976). The Mayor agreed to this project, and it was
completed by the District of Columbia Department of General Services and private
contractors at a cost of over $30,000.
94. 23 D.C. Reg. 660 (1976). See I Op. C.C.D.C. 89 (1976).
95. Self-Government Act § 442, D.C. Code § 47-221.
96. See Opinion of the Corp. Counsel re The Legal Force & Effect of a Resolution
Adopted by the Council, supra note 63, at 280-81.
97. 1 D.C. Stat. 267 (1975).
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government and its agencies to all members of the Council, the public
libraries of the District . . ." and directs them "to compile and make
available . . . a catalog that will index and provide a bibliography for all
publications, studies, and reports, prepared by, or under the auspices of,
the Government of the District of Columbia.""8 Such a monumental
undertaking would have required substantial expenditures, involving
diversion of funds appropriated by Congress to the District for other
programs. Another example is Resolution No. 1-97, which directs the
Mayor to "conduct an examination into the feasibility of implementing a
residency requirement for . . . District employees, in connection with
the development and administration of a personnel system . . .,99
Section 422(3) of the Charter'0 directs the Council to enact a District
government merit system, but does not authorize it to order the Mayor to
conduct such an examination. A final example is Resolution No. 1-160,
which requires "[e]very District government agency [to] develop and
submit to the Mayor and Council an affirmative action plan." ' The
Council, however, has no authority by resolution to require executive
agencies to develop and submit such reports, and it apparently conceded
as much, for it subsequently enacted legislation along similar lines.' 0 2
The reports, compilations, and plans sought by these resolutions are
quite distinct from the evidence which the Council may require of any
person pursuant to a valid investigation of District affairs under section
413(a) of the Charter. 0 3 This provision authorizes the Council to require
executive personnel to testify or produce books, papers, or other exist-
ing evidence, but does not authorize it to require such officers by
resolution to collect evidence, make compilations, render judgments, or
develop policy.
The Council has attempted to compel executive officers not only by
the direct use of resolutions, but also by the enactment of legislation
authorizing the Council to take such actions at a later date by the use of
resolutions. Such legislation, however, does not legitimize a use of the
resolution which is contrary to the Charter. A prime example is the
Council's enactment of D.C. Law No. 1-111, the District of Columbia
Fire Department Operations Act of 1976. l(4 The Act was essentially an
98. Id.
99. I D.C. Stat. 265 (1975).
100. D.C. Code § 1-162(3).
101. 22 D.C. Reg. 3533 (1976).
102. The Affirmative Action Employment Plan, D.C. Law No. 1-63, D.C. Code § 1-
320a-h.
103. See note 52 supra.
104. D.C. Code § 4-401.
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emotional response to a fatal fire occurring September 8, 1976, in which
the station nearest the blaze was temporarily closed pursuant to a rota-
tion system necessitated by lack of sufficient funds to keep all stations in
the City open on a full time basis. 105 As a result, fire equipment arrived
perhaps a few minutes later than it would have if the nearest station had
been open. 106 In an attempt to prevent further such occurrences, the
Council passed an emergency act which would have transferred authori-
ty over day-to-day operations of the Fire Department from the Mayor
and Fire Chief to the Council. 107 The Act provided that "the District shall
be divided into such fire companies, and subunits, thereof as the Council
of the District of Columbia may from time to time direct," and that "[n]o
decreases in the number of companies, changes in the type of
companies, or changes in the location of stationhouses shall be made
unless previously approved by resolution of the Council."'' 10 The Mayor
vetoed the measure on the ground that it would deprive the Fire Chief of
the flexibility he needed to meet rapidly changing conditions which could
occur in major fires or natural disasters. He noted that "in emergency
situations there will usually not be time to wait for a member of the
Council to introduce a resolution permitting an action, for the Council to
gather a quorum to consider the action, and (assuming consideration as
an emergency resolution) for two-thirds of the Council to approve the
resolution" without endangering the public safety by the delay.1°9
Though the Council was unable to override the Mayor's veto of the
emergency measure, it enacted permanent legislation which was only
slightly less objectionable. It provided, as did the emergency measure,
that "[t]he District shall be divided into such fire companies, and other
units as the Council of the District of Columbia may from time to time
direct," but modified the subsequent provision slightly by providing that
"[m]ajor changes in the manner the Department provides fire protection
105. See Wash. Star, Sept. 8, 1976, § A, at 1, col.l. (final ed.); Wash. Post, Sept. 9,
1976, § D, at 1, col. I.
106. The incident also engendered a $5 million suit against the District. Chandler v.
District of Columbia, CA No. 8623-77 (D.C. Super. Ct., filed Sept. 2, 1977). However, the
suit was dismissed on the ground that the damage resulted from a discretionary action on
the part of the District. Order of Revercomb, J. (Mar. 8, 1978).
107. Emergency District of Columbia Fire Department Operations Act of 1976,
Emergency Act No. 1-70 (Nov. 11, 1976) (unpublished).
108. Id. § 2. The current law at that time, D.C. Code § 4-401 (1973), provided:
"The fire department of the District of Columbia shall embrace the whole of the said
District, and its personal and movable property shall be assigned and located as the
[Mayor] of said District may direct within the appropriations made by Congress."
109. Unpublished veto message of the Mayor, Nov. 18, 1976. See also Opinions of the
Corp. Counsel re Emergency Act No. 1-70. 1 Op. C.C.D.C. 336, 362 (1976).
1978]
Catholic University Law Review
and fire prevention shall be approved by resolution of the Council.""'
However, the substitution of this ambiguous phrase for the more precise
phrase "decreases in the number of companies, Changes in the type of
companies, or changes in the location of stationhouses" resulted in little
improvement, as any of these specific changes could be considered by
the Council to constitute "[m]ajor changes in the manner the Department
provides fire protection and fire prevention." Either measure represents
an attempt by the Council to assume direct and continuing control over
an executive function of the utmost importance to the public safety. The
Mayor neither approved nor vetoed the act, and it purportedly became
law without his approval."'I Fortunately, the Council has not yet adopted
a resolution pursuant to this act.
The importance of the preservation of these three primary powers of
the Mayor-the appointment power, the veto power, and the power to
control executive officers-in the face of sustained efforts by the
Council to draw such power into its "impetuous vortex," cannot be
underestimated. The District Charter contemplated, and the exigencies
of local government require, a strong Mayor to counterbalance the
concentration of legislative power vested in the Council.
D. Quo Warranto and the Council's Authority Over the
Qualifications of its Members
The executive has not been alone in evoking the principle of separation
of powers. The Council has reciprocated by charging encroachments by
the executive in the case of District of Columbia v. Tucker. 12 On June 6,
1977, the Corporation Counsel initiated an action in quo warranto in the
110. D.C. Law No. 1-lll, § 2, D.C. Code § 4-401.
111. The act is subject to an invalidating procedural infirmity. It was not presented to
the Mayor until December 21, 1976. Section 404(e) of the Self-Government Act, D.C.
Code § 1-144(e), requires that the Mayor be given 10 working days from his formal receipt
of the bill to decide whether to approve or veto an act. However, the belated transmittal of
the Act did not give the Mayor the required 10 days before the expiration of the first
Council period on January 2, 1977 in accordance with § 401(b)(l), D.C. Code § 1-141(b)(1).
The need for this time was acutely demonstrated by the large number of acts transmitted
to the Mayor at the end of the year. The Council, of course, is not a continuous body, as
six or seven of its membership of thirteen must be filled each biennium. Id. § 401(b)(4),
D.C. Code § 1-141(b)(4). Acts of the Council which do not "become law" pursuant to §
404(e) before the end of the Council period in which they were enacted are nullities. See
Opinion of the Corp. Counsel re Status of Acts of the Council of the District of Columbia
Pending as of the End of the 94th Congress and the First Council Period (Dec. 30, 1976)
reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 95-1104, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS. 9 (1978). A recently reported
congressional Bill, H.R. 12116, supra note 6, would clarify the pocket veto authority of
the Mayor implicit in the Charter.
112. 106 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 41 (Super. Ct. D.C. 1977).
[Vol. 27:515
Separation of Powers
Superior Court of the District of Columbia against the Chairman of the
Council on the ground that he lacked de jure title to his office by his
failure to maintain the qualifications required by the Charter for holding
office. Specifically, it was alleged that the Chairman engaged in outside
employment for profit in violation of section 403(c) of the Charter,'1 3 and
thereby forfeited his office pursuant to section 402.114 The Corporation
Counsel took the action in the name of the District of Columbia pursuant
to D.C. Code sections 16-3521 to 3545 (1973), which authorizes the is-
suance of a writ of quo warranto against any person who "unlawfully
holds or exercises . . . a public office of the District of Columbia, civil
or military .. . " and upon such a finding requires a judgment of ouster
and exclusion from office." 5
The Council, which was given leave to file a memorandum as amicus
curiae, argued that this action by the Corporation Counsel violated the
principle of separation of powers implicit in the Charter on the theory
that this principle required that the qualifications of Council members be
controlled, or at least be subject to. initiation, by the Council, rather than
the executive or judicial branches of government. Noting that the Self-
Government Act did not contain a provision authorizing the Council to
determine the qualifications of its members, 116 the court rejected this
argument and held that an action by the highest legal officer in the
government was the proper and traditional method to judge the qualifica-
tions of elected legislative officers. 117 The court concluded that a quo
warranto action by the Corporation Counsel against the Council Chair-
man was not contrary to the principle of separation of powers and,
indeed, was the only method available in the District to test a Council
member's title to office. 118 The court ruled that the Chairman had in fact
violated the prohibition of the Charter against engaging in outside em-
ployment, but refused to enter a judgment of ouster. 19
Not surprisingly, soon after the institution of the action, legislation
was introduced in the Council which would divest the Corporation
113. D.C. Code § 1-143(c).
114. D.C. Code § 1-142.
115. D.C. Code § 16-3545 (1973).
116. In contrast, the Houses of Congress have such power. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl.
1.
117. 106 DAILY WASH. L. REP. at 44-45. The court further noted that even if such a
provision existed, this still would not preclude an action in quo warranto by the chief legal
officer to test the qualifications of a legislator. Id. at 44, n.20 (citing Buckman v. State ex
rel. Spencer, 34 Fla. 48, 15 So. 697 (1894); Snowball v. People ex rel. Grupe, 147 Il. 260,
35 N.E. 538 (1893); State ex rel. Love v. Cosgrave, 85 Neb. 187, 194, 122 N.W. 885, 888
(1909)).
118. 106 DAILY WASH. L. REP. at 45.
119. Id. at 51.
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Counsel of his authority to institute quo warranto actions against mem-
bers of the Council, thereby divesting the Superior Court of authority to
adjudicate such actions. 120 However, the bill is legally defective as it
would diminish the civil jurisidiction of the Superior Court in violation of
the Charter.121 This use of its legislative power as a sword to destroy the
executive's authority to initiate quo warranto actions renders the
Council's use of the principle of separation of powers as a shield against
such actions very questionable.122
III. THE LEGISLATURE V. THE JUDICIARY
Actions of the Council raising serious separation of power problems
have been directed at the judicial branch as well as the executive,
although not to the same extent. Fortunately, however, Congress took
great pains to assure the independence of the District judiciary. The
Charter provides for the appointment of judges by the President and
their confirmation by the Senate 23 from a list of candidates provided by
the District of Columbia Judicial Nomination Commission, a body
constituted by federal, District, and private appointees. 24 A judge
deemed "well-qualified" or better by the District of Columbia Commis-
sion on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure, a similarly constituted body, is
120. Bill No. 2-196, 24 D.C. Reg. 1145 (1977), introduced by Council member Clarke on
July 26, 1977.
121. The measure, if enacted, would be invalid as it would contravene the Charter and
other provisions of the Self-Government Act. Section 431(a) of the Charter, D.C. Code,
tit. 11, app., at 438, vests the Superior Court with jurisidiction over all civil actions. D.C.
Code § l 1-921(a)(3)(A)(vi) (1973), enacted by the Court Reorganization Act, vests that
court, as part of its civil jurisdiction, with authority over quo warranto actions. The
Council is explicitly prohibited from enacting any legislation with respect to this section or
any other section of title 11 of the D.C. Code under § 602(a)(4) of the Act, D.C. Code § 1-
147(a)(4). Moreover, § 718(a) of the Act, D.C. Code tit. il, app., at 443, continues the
District of Columbia courts as established under the Court Reorganization Act. Only
Congress can so alter the jurisidiction of the Superior Court.
122. Recently, however, congressional legislation was introduced which would amend
the Charter to grant the Council the enclusive authority over the qualifications of its
members. H.R. 10671, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. (1978), introduced February 1, 1978, by
Representative Charles C. Diggs, Jr., would, inter alia, amend the forfeiture provision in §
402 of the Charter, D.C. Code § 1-142, to give the Council the authority, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of its total membership, to expel any member who fails to
maintain the qualifications of office provided by that section, and, in the case of the
Chairman, by § 403(c), D.C. Code § 1-143(c). The bill would also amend the latter section
to permit the Chairman of the Council to engage in occasional teaching, writing, or
lecturing, as defined by the Council by regulation. However, both the Mayor and the
Chairman of the Council opposed these parts of the bill in the hearings held March 16,
1978.
123. Self-Government Act § 433(a), D.C. Code tit. 1, app., at 440.
124. Id. § 434, D.C. Code, tit. 11, app., at 441-42.
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automatically reappointed for an additional fifteen year term.,25 It is
significant that the whole of part C of the Charter, which contains the
provisions concerning the judicial branch, unlike parts A and B, which
concern the legislative and executive branches, respectively, is not sub-
ject to amendment by the people pursuant to the Charter amendment
procedure, 2 6 but may only be changed by act of Congress. Moreover,
the Council is expressly prohibited from enacting any legislation "with
respect to any provision of title 11 of the District of Columbia Code
(relating to the organization and jurisdiction of the District of Columbia
courts)."'12 7 To allay any doubt as to the status of the courts, the Self-
Government Act further provides that they "shall continue as provided
under the District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970
... ,128 Congress, having recently enacted a comprehensive reform of
the local court system, did not desire to subject it to further change by
the Council. 129 Finally, to assure the fiscal independence of the courts,
the Charter provides that the budget of the judiciary is not subject to
revision by the Council or the Mayor.' 30
The most serious attempt by the Council to encroach upon the prov-
ince of the District of Columbia courts was its enactment of the District
of Columbia Shop-Book Rule Act in early 1976.131 The Act was designed
to fill a void in the rules governing the admissibility of evidence in the
Superior Court caused by the repeal of the federal "Shop-Book Rule"
Act, 132 which applied to the Superior Court, as well as other article I
courts, and the federal judiciary. That statute provided an exception to
the hearsay rule for records kept in the ordinary course of business. The
federal Act was repealed in conjunction with the enactment of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 133 which included a provision-Rule 803(6)-
superseding the federal "Shop-Book Rule" Act. However, the Federal
Rules of Evidence, unlike the repealed federal Act, did not apply, by
their own terms, to the Superior Court.'34
125. Id. § 433(c), D.C. Code, tit. 11, app., at 441. See Part IV-B infra.
126. Id, § 303(a), D.C. Code § 1-125(a).
127. Id. § 602(a)(4), D.C. Code § 1-147(a)(4).
128. Id. § 718, D.C. Code, tit. 11, app., at 443.
129. See STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, HOME RULE FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 1973 - 1974, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1074, 1097-98 (Comm. Print
1974) (markup by full Committee of H.R. 9056, July 24, 1973, remarks of Rep. Adams).
130. Self-Government Act § 445, D.C. Code, tit. 11, app. at 443.
131. Act No. 1-88, 22 D.C. Reg. 4551 (1976).
132. 28 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (1970).
133. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 2(b), 88 Stat. 1926, 1949 (1975).
134. FED. R. EvID. 1101(a).
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There was little disagreement about the desirability of retaining a
"shop-book rule" for the Superior Court. The controversy arose over
the means by which the void would be filled, or more precisely, whether
it should be filled by the courts or the Council. In anticipation of the
repeal of the federal "Shop-Book Rule" Act, which would coincide with
the effective date of the Federal Rules of Evidence, July 1, 1975, the
Superior Court, with the approval of the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, promulgated Superior Court Civil Rule 43-I and analogous rules
in other divisions of the court,135 which, in effect, reinstated the federal
"Shop-Book Rule" Act in that court. The courts took this action pur-
suant to their power under D.C. Code section 11-946 (1973)136 to modify
federal procedural rules, which were initially made applicable to the
Superior Court, and to promulgate other rules governing the business of
the court. Such rules, of course, have the force and effect of law. 137
The Council intended the proposed District of Columbia Shop-Book
Rule Act 38 to accomplish exactly the same thing. This legislative solu-
tion, however, was opposed by both the executive and judicial branches
of the District government as an infringement of the rulemaking authori-
ty of the courts in violation of the principle of separation of powers. The
Corporation Counsel argued 139 that the power of the courts of the Dis-
trict of Columbia to promulgate rules of evidence had long been con-
sidered an essential element of the judicial power of such courts.140 By
vesting the judicial power of the District in the Superior Court and
District of Columbia Court of Appeals' 41 and by continuing them as
established under the Court Reorganization Act, 42 Congress had intend-
ed to assure the inviolability of this element of the courts' authority. The
135. SMALL CLAIMS R. 2, DOMESTIC RELATIONS R. 43-1, CRIMINAL R. 57(a), TAX Div.
R. I I(a), JUVENILE R. 114, INTRAFAMILY R. 1, NEGLECT R. 1, MENTAL HEALTH R. 4(a)(1),
and MENTAL RETARDATION R. 12(g).
* 136. This section, as the remainder of title II of the D.C. Code, was enacted by the
District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, tit. I, 84 Stat.
475 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the Court Reorganization Act].
137. See In re C.A.P., 356 A.2d 335, 343 (D.C. 1976); Campbell v. United States, 295
A.2d 498, 501 (D.C. 1972).
138. Bill No. 1-137, 21 D.C. Reg. 3694 (1975), introduced June 17, 1975, by Council
member Clarke.
139. See Unpublished Opinion of the Corp. Counsel re Bill 1-137, the D.C. Shop-Book
Rule Act (Dec. 19, 1975).
140. Id. (citing Griffen v. United States, 336 U.S. 704, 716-17 (1949); Fisher v. United
States, 328 U.S. 463, 476-77 (1946); and Cropley v. Volger, 2 App. D.C. 34 (D.C. Cir.
1893)).
141. Self-Government Act § 431(a), D.C. Code tit. 11, app., at 438.
142. Id. § 718(a), D.C. Code, tit. 11, app., at 443. See D.C. Code §§ 11-101, -701, -901
(1973).
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Corporation Counsel also noted that the Council was expressly pro-
hibited 143 from enacting legislation with respect to D.C. Code section 11-
946 (1973), the source of the courts' rulemaking authority. He concluded
that the power of the Council with respect to the District of Columbia
courts under the Self-Government Act was miniscule in comparison with
the authority of Congress over the federal judiciary under the Constitu-
tion, 144 and that the proposed act exceeded the Council's authority.
Although passed by the Council on December 16, 1975, the bill was
vetoed by the Mayor on January 7, 1976 on the grounds that it exceeded
the Council's authority and that it would be superfluous in light of the
action of the courts. 145 The Council, however, overrode the Mayor's
veto, and, pursuant to the Charter, the Act was transmitted to the
President for a decision whether the veto would stand.146 Noting that the
promulgation of this procedural rule was clearly within the express
power of the local courts, and, as such beyond the power of the Council,
President Ford sustained the Mayor's veto. 147 This was the first and, thus
far, the only time that a President has exercised his authority to sustain
the Mayor's overridden veto.
The President's action temporarily ended the controversy over the
respective roles of the legislative and judicial branches of the District
government in the promulgation of rules of evidence and other procedur-
al rules. A number of popular bills which contained provisions imposing
rules of evidence on the Superior Court died. 148 The controversy, how-
ever, has not ended as members of the Council continue to introduce
legislation imposing rules of evidence upon the District of Columbia
courts. For example, the proposed Medical Records Act of 1977149 would
143. Id. § 602(a)(4), D.C. Code § 1-147(a)(4).
144. The Council's authority over rules of court is more akin to the authority of the
New Jersey legislature defined in Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 74 A.2d 406, cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950), where the court held that the state constitution provision that
"[t]he Supreme Court shall make rules governing the administration of all courts in the
State and, subject to law, the practice and procedure in all such courts" ousted the power
of the state legislature over rules of court. Id. at 414. Accord, Burton v. Mayer, 274 Ky.
263, 118 S.W.2d 547 (1938); Lee v. Baird, 146 N.C. 361, 59 S.E. 876 (1907).
145. Unpublished veto message of the Mayor (Jan. 7, 1976).
146. See Self-Government Act § 404(e), D.C. Code § 1-144(e).
147. The President's Message to the Chairman of the Council on His Disapproval of
the D.C. Shop-Book Rule Act, 12 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 301 (Feb. 27, 1976).
148. The Medical Records Act of 1975, Bill No. 1-149, 21 D.C. Reg. 4397 (1975)
(Council member Shackleton); the D.C. Psychiatric Confidentiality Act, Bill No. 1-172, 22
D.C. Reg. 771 (1975) (Council member Shackleton); the Prior Sexual Conduct Evidence
Act of 1975, Bill No. 1-214, 22 D.C. Reg. 3011 (1975) (Council member Hobson and six
cosponsors).
149. Bill No. 2-233, 24 D.C. Reg. 3791 (1977).
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render any "secondary medical record"' 150 inadmissible as evidence in
any proceeding by the courts of the District of Columbia.
The line between the rulemaking power of the courts and the legisla-
tive power of the Council was clarified somewhat by the decision of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals in In re C.A.P. ,'51 rendered soon
after the President's disapproval of the District of Columbia Shop-Book
Rule Act. The court held that Superior Court Neglect Rule 18(c), which
authorized, in certain circumstances, the termination of parental rights in
a child neglect case, was without statutory basis 52 and beyond the
inherent authority of the Superior Court.' The court of appeals rea-
soned that the termination of parental rights abridged the substantive
right to conceive and raise one's children, 15 4 and, thus, could not be
effected under the Superior Court's general authority to promulgate
rules of procedure. Partially in response to this decision, the Council
enacted the Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act of 1977,155 which
supplied the legislative basis for the authority of the Family Division of
the Superior Court to terminate parental rights pursuant to Superior
Court Neglect Rule 18(c).156
In sum, it appears that the District of Columbia courts possess the
exclusive power to promulgate rules of procedure governing the business
of the courts, while only the Council possesses the authority to enact
rules that affect substantive rights. The line between substantive rights
and procedural rules, however, is still unclear. Further judicial decisions
will be required to define the parameters of each sphere of authority.
IV. THE JUDICIARY V. THE EXECUTIVE
In contrast to the frequent tension between the legislative and execu-
tive branches of the District government, relations between the execu-
tive and the judiciary have been extremely placid. Nevertheless, two
matters have brought these branches briefly into conflict. The first
150. The term "secondary medical record" as distinguished from "primary medical
record" is defined in the bill to include records "'used to study morbidity and mortality"
by certain governmental agencies or medical entities and records "used for professional
training, supervision or discipline" of practitioners.
151. 356 A.2d 335 (D.C. 1976).
152. The statutory provisions relating to proceedings before the Family Division of the
Superior Court are found in D.C. Code §§ 16-2301 to 2337 (1973).
153. Local rules with federal analogues that differ from the federal rules must be
approved by the D.C. Court of Appeals, but ones governing areas where the federal rules
are silent may be promulgated by the Superior Court alone. See D.C. Code § 11-946
(1973).
154. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
155. D.C. Law No. 2-22, 24 D.C. Reg. 3341 (1977) (eff. Sept. 23, 1977).
156. Id. § 407(c), 24 D.C. Reg. at 774 (1977) (amending D.C. Code § 16-2320(a) (1973)).
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involved the authority of a Superior Court judge over the Corporation
Counsel, and the second involved the authority of the District of Colum-
bia Commission on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure over a Superior
Court judge.
A. Judicial Authority to Require Executive Representation
of Private Litigants
The dispute which resulted in charges of judicial encroachment on the
province of the executive arose over the authority of a Superior Court
judge to order the Corporation Counsel to represent a private parental
petitioner in a proceeding for the involuntary commitment of a mentally
ill adult in the case of District of Columbia v. Pryor. 157 The applicable
statute1 58 requires a parent desiring the involuntary commitment of an
adult child to petition the Commission on Mental Health, which acts as a
special master for the Superior Court. After accepting the case, the
Commission holds a hearing and makes findings, recommendations, and
conclusions of law, which it reports to the Superior Court. A person
whose commitment is sought has a right to counsel in any proceeding
before the Commission or the Superior Court. There is no provision in
current law, however, for the representation of the petitioner himself.
Prior law provided for such representation by the Corporation Counsel,
but this provision was repealed and is not in the present statute.
1 59
Nevertheless, a Superior Court judge ordered the Corporation
Counsel to represent the parental petitioners in two cases before the
Superior Court in which the Commission on Mental Health had recom-
mended civil commitment. After the court denied the District's motion to
vacate the appointments, the District petitioned the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition, or in the alternative, for a writ
of mandamus against the trial judge on the ground that the Superior
Court was without authority to make the appointments. The court of
appeals agreed and held that a Superior Court judge had no inherent
discretionary authority to appoint the Corporation Counsel to represent
private parties in such cases. Citing the statutory basis of the Corpora-
tion Counsel's responsibilities, 160 the court made the following observa-
tions:
Subservience to the chief executive officer of the District gov-
ernment is the major thesis of this provision. To accept or create
157. 366 A.2d 141 (D.C. 1976).
158. D.C. Code § 21-541 (1973).
159. D.C. Code § 21-312 (1961).
160. D.C. Code § 1-301 (1973).
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an additional obligation to obey a court order to undertake
representation of private citizens in mental health cases would
not only be antithetical to the statute, but also would be contrary
to the separation of powers concept so solidly ingrained in our
governmental system. That one in public office is also a member
of the Bar can be of no significance, for the two roles cannot be
deemed separate and the order of appointment cannot be based
on professional association as paramount to official responsibil-
ity and authority. 161
Thus, this conflict between the judicial and executive branches was
amicably resolved.
B. Interference with Judicial Independence: The Powers
of the Tenure Commission
The issue of executive interference with judicial independence arose
in an unusual context in the case of Halleck v. Berliner.162 The alleged
encroachment was not by the executive branch of the District govern-
ment, but by the independent District of Columbia Commission on
Judicial Disabilities and Tenure and the executive branch of the federal
government. The District executive, however, was involved in the case
as legal representative of the Commission.
The Tenure Commission, established by the Court Reorganization
Act 163 and continued by the Self-Government Act,"6 consists of seven
members; two appointed by the Mayor and two by the local Bar, and one
each by the President, the Council, and the Chief Judge of the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia. 165 It possesses two
distinct powers-the power to remove, suspend, or retire a judge of of
the District of Columbia courts for disability, malfeasance, or other
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, 166 and the power,
added by the Self-Government Act, to determine whether a sitting judge
seeking another term shall be reappointed.167 Pursuant to its reappoint-
ment power, the Commission routinely evaluates each sitting judge
shortly before his term expires, based on information received in confi-
dence from the Bar and the public, and rates the judge as exceptionally
well qualified, well qualified, qualified, or unqualified. Either of the first
161. 366 A.2d at 143 (citation omitted).
162. 427 F. Supp. 1225 (D.D.C. 1977).
163. D.C. Code § 11-1521 (1973).
164. Self-Government Act § 718(a), D.C. Code, tit. 11, app., at 443.
165. Id. § 431(e)(3), D.C. Code, tit. II, app., at 439.
166. Id. § 432, D.C. Code, tit. 11, app., at 439-40.
167. Id. § 433(c), D.C. Code, tit. 1I, app., at 441.
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two ratings results in his automatic reappointment. A rating of "qual-
ified" does not assure reappointment, but gives the President the option,
with the advice and consent of the Senate, to reappoint the judge-the
same procedure that was followed prior to home rule. A rating of "un-
qualified" precludes reappointment.
The first judge to be evaluated by the Tenure Commission under its
new authority was Charles W. Halleck of the Superior Court, who had
been appointed by President Johnson for a ten-year term expiring Octo-
ber 20, 1975. He received a rating of "qualified," leaving his reappoint-
ment to the President's discretion. President Ford nominated him for
another term, and the Senate District of Columbia Committee reported
the nomination to the full Senate. However, the Senate took no action
prior to its adjournment sine die on October 1, 1976, necessitating the
return of the nomination to the President. 16 Though his term had ex-
pired, Judge Halleck continued serving as a hold-over judge. 169 While
Judge Halleck's nomination was pending in the Senate, the Tenure
Commission, pursuant to its removal power, initiated an investigation to
determine whether grounds existed for disciplinary action and served
him with a Notice of Formal Proceeding based on allegations of
"conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice" as defined by the
Code of Judicial Conduct of the American Bar Association. 170 On the eve
of the date set for the hearing on these charges, Judge Halleck filed suit
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to enjoin
the Commission from holding the hearing and for a declaratory judgment
that the removal and reappointment powers of the Commission were
unconsitutional encroachments on the independence of the judiciary. In
addition, he contended that the Commission was unduly influenced by an
"institutionalized effort" by the United States Attorney's Office for the
District of Columbia to prevent his reappointment, and that this
constituted an impermissible encroachment by the federal executive on
the District judiciary.
The Tenure Commission, represented by the Corporation Counsel,
responded that Congress, given its plenary power over the District under
article I, section 8, clause 17, of the Constitution,' 7 1 was not compelled to
grant to an article I judge of the District of Columbia courts tenure equal
to that given by the Constitution to an article III judge. It noted that the
168. Standing Rules of the Senate, Rule XXXVIII(6), Senate Manual, 94th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1975).
169. See D.C. Code § 11-1502 (1973).
170. Adopted for the District of Columbia courts by the Joint Committee on Judicial
Administration. See D.C. Code 11-1701(a) (1973); District of Columbia Courts, Annual
Report 8 (1973).
171. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
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drafters of the Court Reorganization and Self-Government Acts con-
sidered the Commission's possession of these powers to enhance, rather
than diminish, judicial independence. The power of removal assured a
high standard of conduct in the District judiciary, raising it beyond
reproach, 172 and the power of reappointment assured that the tenure of a
well qualified judge would be removed from the political process. 173
The court 74 rejected Judge Halleck's arguments and held that the
principle of separation of powers was not offended by a statutory
scheme which allocated to an independent agency functions that had
previously been exercised not by the judiciary, but by the President and
Senate.175 Furthermore, the court rejected the charge of undue influence
by the United States Attorney's Office as not supported by the evi-
dence. 176 Halleck v. Berliner settled the authority of the Tenure Commis-
sion over the judicial branch of the District government. The instant
controversy was laid to rest when President Carter decided not to reap-
point Judge Halleck.
V. CONCLUSION
The experiences of the District of Columbia government during the
first three years of home rule demonstrate the need for, and continued
vitality of, the principle of separation of powers. During this period, each
of the three branches was involved in at least one serious dispute over
the proper boundaries of its powers with each of the other branches.
True to the fears of the drafters of the Constitution, the legislative
branch has adopted the most expansive definition of its powers. Its
frequent attempts to extend its sphere of activity and absorb the powers
of the other branches have been directed principally at the executive
branch and unfortunately, many of the conflicts precipitated by these
encroachments on the executive, in contrast to other disputes between
the branches, remain unresolved. However despite the tension and un-
certainty engendered by these experiences, they have reaffirmed the key
role of the separation of governmental powers and its corollary system of
checks and balances in assuring the stability and vitality of the District of
Columbia government.
172. See S. REP. No. 91-405, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1969).
173. See 119 CONG. REC. 40315-16 (1973) (statement of Rep. Diggs on the Self-
Government Act conference report).
174. Judge Roszel C. Thomsen, Senior District Judge of the District of Maryland,
sitting by designation. The judges of the District Court of the District of Columbia had all
recused themselves, probably because one of their associates, Judge Gerhard Gesell, was
a member of the Tenure Commission.
175. 427 F. Supp. at 1234.
176. Id. at 1234-35.
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